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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
NEOCLASSICAL TRADITION IN LABOR ECONOMICS 
GEORGE R. BOYER and ROBERT S. SMITH* 
This essay on labor economics examines neoclassical theory's rise to 
ascendancy following the second World War, with a secondary focus on 
the relative decline but continued influence of institutionalist eco-
nomic theory. The authors describe the evolution of institutional and 
neoclassical theory from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries, 
examine some early intellectual debates between the two camps, briefly 
describe the work of neoclassical labor economics pioneers, and look at 
major developments over the past 30 years. They argue that neoclassical 
economists' increasing intellectual breadth and influence in public 
policy have led them to pay closer attention to issues that have long been 
of concern to institutionalists and "neoinstitutionalists." 
The field of labor e c o n o m i c s has changed dramatically in the postwar 
period. At the end of the second World 
War, labor economics was domina ted by a 
group of academics who, while knowledge-
able of neoclassical theory, had their roots 
in the insti tutionalist approach to econom-
ics. However, the next thirty years saw the 
rise to dominance of an approach to labor 
economics that was rooted in neoclassical 
economic theory. The same period saw a 
decl ine , within economics depa r tmen t s , of 
institutionalist-based labor economics. The 
*The authors are Professors in the Department of 
Labor Economics, New York State School of Indus-
trial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. They 
thank John Abowd, Robert Aronson, Francine Blau, 
Ronald Ehrenberg, Gary Fields, Robert Hutchens, 
George Jakubson, Lawrence Kahn, Harry Katz, and 
Marcus Rebick for their perspectives on postwar labor 
economics and comments on various drafts of this 
essay. 
institutionalist approach survived, and in 
some universities cont inued to thrive, but 
its pract i t ioners tended to move out of eco-
nomics depar tments and into depar tments 
of industrial relat ions or business schools. 
This essay chronicles the rise to dominance 
of the neoclassical approach to labor eco-
nomics. 
We begin by describing the roots of the 
institutionalist and neoclassical "camps" in 
the half-century before the second World 
War. This is followed by an examinat ion of 
the state of labor economics in the first 
postwar decade , and of some early intellec-
tual debates between the insti tutional and 
neoclassical camps. We then briefly de-
scribe the work of four of the pioneers of 
neoclassical labor economics—H. Gregg 
Lewis, Gary Becker, Jacob Mincer, and 
George Stigler. Finally, we examine some 
of the major developments in neoclassical 
labor economics since the early 1970s, and 
show how the neoclassical has been influ-
enced by the insti tutional approach. 
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Our essay is an attempt to generate some 
insights into how economic thought about 
labor issues has developed and been modi-
fied over the past half century. It is not 
meant to be a survey of all aspects of labor 
economics, both neoclassical and institu-
tional. Our focus throughout is on the 
development and modification of the neo-
classical approach. We begin with the roots 
of the two alternative approaches to study-
ing the labor market. 
The Historical 
Antecedents of Two Traditions 
During the interwar years, the entire 
discipline of economics was characterized 
by what one recent author (Yonay 1998) 
has termed a "struggle over the soul of 
economics" between two fundamentally 
distinct approaches toward understanding 
economic phenomena: neoclassical eco-
nomics and institutionalism. Neoclassical 
economics began in the late nineteenth 
century as a challenge to the classical eco-
nomics of David Ricardo and John Stuart 
Mill. It "replaced the individual economic 
agent as a sociological or historical datum 
by the utility-maximizing individual" 
(Stigler 1969:225). Although classical eco-
nomics and neoclassical economics con-
tained similar laissez-faire social philoso-
phies, the issues addressed by the two 
schools were much different. Classical eco-
nomics had focused on economic growth; 
neoclassical economics focused on issues 
of relative prices and allocation of a given 
set of resources. According to the English 
economist Joan Robinson (1953:22), classi-
cal economics had been concerned with 
"big questions," such as the distribution of 
output among wages, rent, and profits. 
Neoclassical economics, on the other hand, 
assumed that the big questions had been 
answered, and focused on "little ques-
tions," such as "Why does an egg cost 
more than a cup of tea?" This new focus 
on prices and their underlying supply 
and demand conditions permitted ana-
lytical techniques thatwere deductive and 
abstract, and in time this approach was to 
become mathematical. 
Institutionalism began in the United 
States at about the same time that Alfred 
Marshall's Principles of Economics (1890) was 
laying the groundwork for what we now call 
neoclassical labor economics. Institution-
alism's roots can be traced back to the 
German historical school of economics, and 
some of its founders, such as Richard Ely, 
had been trained in Germany (McNulty 
1980:131-33; Kaufman 1993:30-31). Ely 
described the economics that was taught in 
American universities in the 1870s and 
1880s as "dry bones"—focusing entirely on 
"natural economic laws" and laissez faire, 
and seeing people as simply "instruments] 
by which wealth is created and not the end 
for which it exists" (Ely 1938:125-27). Ely 
rejected this "barren" approach, and turned 
his attention to the study of practical prob-
lems (including those facing the American 
labor movement) using a variety of meth-
ods.1 In 1886 he published The Labor Move-
ment in America, which, while largely a his-
torical work, is regarded by many as the first 
American labor economics text. 
In 1892 the University of Wisconsin hired 
Ely to be director of the newly formed 
School of Economics, Political Science, and 
History, and in 1904 he hired his former 
student at Johns Hopkins, John R. Com-
mons, to teach labor economics. Com-
mons "turned the University of Wisconsin 
in Madison into a center of institutionalist 
research, that is, of rigorous study of the 
evolution and practicing of various eco-
nomic organizations" (Yonay 1998:51). In 
1905, two of Commons's colleagues at Wis-
consin, Thomas Adams and Helen Sumner, 
published a textbook entitled Labor Prob-
lems, which typified the institutionalist ap-
proach to labor economics. In the preface 
Adams and Sumner (1905:v) wrote that 
"the principal aim of this book is to furnish 
'According to McNulty (1980:133), Ely's interests 
were "so wide ... that only a fraction of the topics on 
which he wrote could be said to belong to the realm 
of economics." As evidence of his broad interests, 
Ely's graduate students later became professors of 
sociology and history as well as economics. 
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a convenient collection of facts that will 
facilitate the study and the teaching of the 
American labor problem." The book had 
two parts: "Evils" and "Remedies." "Evils" 
contained chapters on women and child 
labor, immigration, the sweating system, 
and poverty. "Remedies" included chap-
ters on unions, profit-sharing, cooperation, 
industrial education, labor laws, and the 
material progress of the wage-earning class. 
In the same year Commons (1905) pub-
lished a collection of recent papers by him-
self and others in a volume entitled Trade 
Unionism and Labor Problems, which comple-
mented the Adams and Sumner text. Thus 
emerged what was later called "institution-
alist labor economics." 
Instinationalist labor economics empha-
sized the word labor. This approach was 
fact-based, its methodology largely was in-
ductive, and it generally relied on a case-
study approach toward data-gathering. 
From the intensive, often historical, study 
of individual cases or events came detailed 
descriptions of various labor-market institu-
tions or outcomes. Followers of this institu-
tional approach differentiated "descriptive 
economics" from "economic theory," and 
saw their role as providing "data sufficiently 
concrete, definite, and convenient to form 
a basis for analysis, discussion, and criti-
cism" (Commons 1905:iii).2 In 1926, a 
reviewer of Solomon Blum'sjust-published 
institutionalist textbook, entitled Labor Eco-
nomics (which appears to be the first book 
with these words in its title), put institu-
tional economics in the following context: 
The economic drift has been and continues to 
be from the deductive to the inductive method 
of attack, ... from the concentration upon the 
logically postulated reactions of the economic 
man to concentration upon groups of men cre-
ating (and being variously affected by) eco-
nomic institutions. In the place of the old, 
single, outstanding problem of the analysis of 
the economic man ... we now face, and have to 
deal with, a long series of problems each of 
For a recent perspective on institutional econom-
ics, see Hodgson (1998). 
which concerns itself with ... an institution or a 
group of institutions and the consequences for 
men of the operation of these institutions. 
(Brissenden 1926) 
In contrast to the institutional approach, 
the neoclassical approach to labor econom-
ics—which emphasizes the word econom-
ics—is built upon posited maximizing mod-
els of firms and workers at the individual 
level, and it is ahistorical in nature. One 
starts, as did Marshall, with certain funda-
mental principles about economic actors, 
not a collection of facts, and from theoreti-
cal analyses (often expressed and reasoned 
mathematically) are drawn hypotheses or 
conclusions about labor market outcomes. 
In its quest for analysis, this approach looks 
for general patterns rather than patholo-
gies peculiar to certain institutions or mar-
kets. Put in terms of modern statistical 
analysis, so widely used in testing hypoth-
eses about the labor market, the neoclassi-
cal approach seeks to discover systematic 
behavioral tendencies, and it comfortably rel-
egates deviations from these tendencies to 
the "unexplained variation" of the error 
term. 
The principal strength of the neoclassi-
cal approach is that it satisfies the scholarly 
yearning for general principles that can 
organize "mere" facts, and it is the absence 
of general principles that was seen as a 
weakness of institutionalism. Ronald Coase 
summed up the work of institutionalists in 
this way: "Without a theory they had noth-
ing to pass on except a mass of descriptive 
material waiting for a theory, or a fire" 
(cited in Posner 1993:206). The principal 
criticism of the theoretic approach is that, 
often, too little attention is given to real-
ity—either in forming hypotheses about 
labor market behaviors or in testing them 
empirically. Again we turn to Coase, who 
wrote, "In my youth it was said that what was 
too silly to be said may be sung. In modern 
economics it may be put into mathematics" 
(cited in Posner 1993:198-99). 
A neoclassical approach to labor eco-
nomics appeared poised to take hold in the 
decade prior to World War II with the pub-
lication of two very different books by the 
same title: The Theory of Wages. John Hicks's 
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The Theory of Wages, published in 1932, was 
a theoretical work with little attempt at 
empirical analysis. Hicks wrote that the 
purpose of his book was to restate "the 
theory of wages in a form which shall be 
reasonably abreast of modern economic 
knowledge" (1932:v), and its chapters dealt 
with labor demand and the theory of mar-
ginal productivity, the supply of labor, com-
petition, and the undesirable side-effects 
of governmental regulation.3 His analysis 
of individuals' supply of labor was influ-
enced by Lionel Robbins's important ar-
ticle published two years earlier, which dem-
onstrated the conditions under which indi-
viduals' labor supply curves were positively 
or negatively sloped.4 
In 1934, Paul Douglas came out with his 
Theory of Wages. Unlike Hicks, Douglas com-
bined theoretical explication with an at-
tempt to "determine the slopes of the de-
mand and supply curves of the various com-
modities" relevant to the production pro-
cess (Douglas 1934:xii) .5 In so doing, Doug-
las—who was very interested in real-world 
problems and public policy issues—tried to 
steer a middle ground between theoretical 
deduction and empirically based induction. 
In the preface he wrote, "The younger gen-
eration of economists ... are increasingly 
turning on the one hand from the sterile 
shadow-boxing which has characterized so 
much of dialectical economics and on the 
other from the theoretical blind alley of the 
purely historical and institutional meth-
ods" (1934:xii). 
Thus, approaches that organized the 
subject matter of labor economics by theo-
Hicks's book also contained a model of the bar-
gaining process between labor and management that 
is still taught in both labor economics and collective 
bargaining courses. 
Prior to Robbins (1930), most economists argued 
that short-run labor supply curves were always nega-
tively sloped. For example, Frank Knight (1921:117-
18) argued that "rational" men would always reduce 
their hours of work when their wage increased. 
Knight's justification for this conclusion is based 
entirely on an analysis of the income effect. 
Douglas's book contained pioneering attempts to 
estimate labor supply elasticities. His analysis of labor 
supply is extended in Schoenberg and Douglas (1937). 
retical concepts, and that stressed general 
principles rather than descriptive detail, 
were neither unknown nor awaiting discov-
ery in the 1930s. Yet the institutionalist 
approach to labor-market issues—dominant 
until then—continued its primacy through 
the first two postwar decades. Why? 
One fundamental reason why a neoclas-
sical approach to labor economics did not 
take hold with the publication of the Hicks 
and Douglas texts was the Great Depres-
sion. Unemployment rates of 25%, closed 
banks, and bread lines focused attention of 
labor-market scholars away from abstrac-
tion and toward policies for the immediate 
amelioration of human suffering. To most, 
the market had clearly failed. It is little 
wonder, then, that market forces, in both 
theory and practice, were either dismissed 
or considered social evils to be mitigated, 
and that labor unions, as institutions that 
had become central actors in many labor 
markets, were accorded such preeminence 
in labor textbooks of the day. In the second 
edition to his Theory of Wages, published in 
1963, Hicks himself lamented that "1932 
was not a lucky date for the appearance of 
a book like this. It was the blackest year of 
the Great Depression; there has been no 
date in this century to which the theory that 
I was putting out could have been more 
inappropriate.... So, soon after its birth, 
The Theory of Wages began to look like the 
last gasp of an ancien regime" (1963:305). 
It is also noteworthy that both Hicks and 
Douglas published little in the field of la-
bor economics after the mid-1930s. Hicks, 
whose interests shifted to economic theory, 
came to believe that his Theory of Wages had 
"fearful gaps" and let it go out of print 
"because my own views upon its subject had 
changed so much that I no longer desired 
to be represented by it" (Hicks 1963:v, 306) .6 
Hicks did, however, allow the book to be re-
printed in 1963, because "it has ... been made clear to 
me that there is still a demand for it" (1963:v). Many 
modern labor economists have a high regard for The 
Theory of Wages. For example, Sherwin Rosen 
(1985:1144) refers to it as a "remarkably enduring 
work." 
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Douglas increasingly turned his energies to 
public life, first as a member of the Chicago 
City Council (1939-42), then as an officer 
in the Marines, and ultimately as a United 
States Senator (after 1948). Thus, the field 
of labor economics was abandoned by the 
two prewar scholars who could have served 
best to advance a neoclassical approach. 
Labor Economics in 
the Early Postwar Period 
As noted, the neoclassical and institu-
tionalist approaches to labor markets re-
flected a larger debate within the field of 
economics during the 1920s and 1930s over 
how the study of economic phenomena 
should be conducted. Despite their deep 
skepticism of neoclassical modeling, insti-
tutionalists generally regarded themselves 
as—and were perceived by others to be— 
economists (Yonay 1998:71-76). Indeed, 
Douglas considered Commons to be "per-
haps the most magnificent economics 
teacher of my time" (Douglas 1971:35), 
and the authors of the institutionalist labor 
textbooks of the 1930s—Blum (1925), 
Carroll Daugherty (1933), Dale Yoder 
(1933), and Harry Millis and Royal Mont-
gomery (1938)—all were members of eco-
nomics departments in their universities. 
At a minimum, the cohabitation of in-
stitutionalists and price theorists in in-
terwar economics departments meant 
that graduate students of the day who 
were interested in labor economics had 
to obtain a grounding in standard eco-
nomic theory. Thus, when World War II 
ended, the field of labor economics was in 
the hands of scholars—most notably, John 
Dunlop, Clark Kerr, Richard Lester, and 
Lloyd Reynolds—who were well-versed in 
neoclassical theory but deeply skeptical of 
its relevance to the real world. In the words 
of Kerr, 
For nascent labor economists in the early 
1930s ... the two most important recent books 
of special relevance were by Lionel Robbins (An 
Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic 
Science, 1932) and by John R. Hicks (The Theory 
of Wages, also 1932). They both carried discour-
aging messages which, if followed, would have 
aborted any interest in labor economics by any 
reasonably intelligent person. The central mes-
sage of the first was that realistic studies were 
the low road and pure theory the high road. 
The central message of the second was that all 
that needed to be known about labor econom-
ics was already known, since it was a sub-branch 
of standard marginal analysis applied to nearly 
perfect labor markets with few special charac-
teristics. (Kerr 1988:1) 
The distinctly ambivalent attitude toward 
neoclassical theory of the early postwar la-
bor economists is reflected in a textbook 
published in 1941 by Princeton's Lester. 
The book, entitled Economics of Labor, be-
gan by explaining to the reader that the 
text was "analytic rather than encyclopedic. 
The emphasis throughout the book is upon 
economic principles rather than upon par-
ticular events or ephemeral facts" (p. vii). 
Lester had by no means turned his back on 
the institutionalist approach, however, as 
can be seen by the book's organization and 
the titles of its three major parts: "labor's 
economic problems"; "organization and 
labor relations"; and "collective bargaining 
in certain industries." Moreover, Lester 
eschewed the very generalization that theory 
seeks: "Generalization is especially diffi-
cult when each problem that arises may be 
unique because it presents a slightly differ-
ent combination of factors or a new set of 
circumstances" (p. 38). Carroll Daugherty, 
in a 1945 paper on the labor field in the 
American Economic Review, described the 
ambivalence of Lester's approach in this 
way: 
There is, in fact, no labor textbook which satis-
factorily employs and integrates the tools of 
economic analysis in its discussions. The best 
thing thus far in this respect is R. A. Lester's 
Economics of Labor ... and labor teachers and 
writers are greatly in his debt. But Lester, after 
berating his competitors in front of his text-
book audience ... misses the trapeze in midair 
and is fortunate to land in the safety net of 
confusion, (p. 655) 
Yale's Reynolds published a textbook 
entitled Labor Economics and Labor Relations 
in 1949, and it also was largely atheoretic in 
its approach. The book's first sentence 
proclaimed it to be an "introduction to the 
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study of labor"—note that despite its title, it 
was not introduced as a study of economics. 
The first 60% of the book was devoted to 
unions (including chapters on union his-
tory, governance, and politics), and the 
chapters in the "economics" section mainly 
described practices followed by firms and 
industries in setting wages. Filled with de-
scriptive narrative on unions, government 
regulations, and employers' practices, 
and sprinkled with a handful of tables 
and charts describing trends and condi-
tions, the book contained virtually no 
analysis of how supply and demand affect 
the price of labor. 
That Reynolds's text dominated the mar-
ket for at least the next two decades is a 
telling indication of how labor economics 
was taught to students during this period. 
Between 1964 and 1970, however, Reynolds 
revised his text to place the section called 
"Economics of the Labor Market" first 
rather than second. While the fifth (1970) 
edition maintained its original flavor—with 
collective bargaining's history, law and gov-
ernance, tactics, and outcomes still occupy-
ing 60% of the space—the preface noted, 
In this edition, I have reversed the previous 
sequence and have placed the economic analy-
sis at the beginning of the book ... First, labor 
economics is basic in the sense that the econom-
ics of collective bargaining is included within 
it ... Second, research in labor economics is 
shifting in a quantitative and econometric di-
rection ... The wealth of new research material 
warrants both enlarging the "economic" com-
ponent of this text and placing it at the begin-
ning of the discussion. (Reynolds 1970:iv) 
More than the ordering of topics, however, 
there was an increased emphasis on theory. 
In contrast to just one graph included in its 
original edition, fully 20 theory-related 
graphs could be found in the "economics" 
part of the book's 1970 edition—which by 
then had chapters on demand and supply. 
The trend that by 1970 had induced a 
major change in Reynolds's text also gave 
birth to the first two thoroughly neoclassi-
cal labor economics textbooks in the post-
war period: Labor Economics: Theory and 
Evidenceby Helton Fleisher (1970), and The 
Economics of Work and Pay by Albert Rees 
(1973). These texts, which in many ways 
were quite similar, had surprisingly little in 
common with the textbooks of the 1940s 
and 1950s, or indeed even with the 1970 
edition of Reynolds's textbook.8 Rees main-
tained in his introduction that economists 
trained in the "institutional tradition ... 
have tended to move into industrial rela-
tions ... and [become] somewhat isolated 
from the main stream of economics." He 
wrote that his book "does not pretend to 
cover industrial relations ... Rather it will 
concentrate on the application of economic 
theory and statistics to the problems of 
labor markets" (Rees 1973:viii). 
A glance at the tables of contents shows 
how different the Fleisher and Rees texts 
were from their predecessors. Gone were 
the long sections on labor history, labor 
law, and union organization, and replacing 
them in both texts was a single chapter 
concerned only with the economic aspects 
of trade unions, such as formal models of 
union objectives and the measurement of 
union-nonunion wage differentials. These 
texts were organized by theoretical con-
structs, not labor issues or institutions, and 
each had chapters on the supply of labor by 
individuals, human capital investments by 
firms and workers, and the demand for 
labor in competitive and noncompetitive 
markets and over both the short and long 
A third book, Richard Freeman's Labor Economics 
(1972), could also be included in this list. Freeman's 
book is theory-based, but it is quite short and was not 
intended to be a text for a full semester course in 
labor economics. 
In 1957 Melvin Reder published a labor econom-
ics textbook that, had it met with more success, might 
have served as a smooth transition between the 
"neoinstitutionalists" and the neoclassicists. The text 
began, as did Reynolds's, with a lengthy section on 
unions, but its economics section was of a very differ-
ent flavor. As opposed to the skepticism about neo-
classical theory of the neoinstitutionalists, Reder was 
fascinated with theory and took pains to both exam-
ine critical assumptions and point out where behav-
ior was—or could be seen as—consistent with theory. 
The market for labor economics texts was clearly not 
ready for such a book, and it did not survive into a 
second edition. 
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run. Both books were so devoid of descrip-
tive material that neither was as long as 300 
pages (Reynolds's book was by now run-
ning nearly 700 pages). 
The change made in Reynolds's text and 
the appearance of two theory-based com-
petitors suggest that the market for the 
neoclassical approach had grown to a criti-
cal size by the early 1970s. Further, since 
textbooks tend to follow intellectual trends, 
not lead them, their change in basic ap-
proach by the early 1970s suggests that 
during the 1950s and 1960s some very im-
portant groundwork had been laid toward 
a new and very different way to conceptual-
ize labor economics. The next sections 
investigate various aspects of how this 
change came about. 
Early Postwar Labor 
Economists: The End of One 
Line or the Continuation of Another? 
Viewed retrospectively, did the work of 
the early postwar labor economists serve as 
a link between Hicks/Douglas in the early 
1930s and the neoclassical labor econo-
mists whose theory-oriented analyses be-
gan to shape the field a generation later? 
Put somewhat differently, can the early 
postwar labor economists best be charac-
terized as institutionalists who knew eco-
nomic theory ("neoinstinationalists"), or as 
neoclassical economists with "realistic" in-
terests? 
Most likely because of their training, their 
academic departments, and the perceived 
obsolescence of "institutionalism," the early 
postwar labor economists have tended to 
see themselves as being in the latter camp— 
as "neoclassical revisionists" striving to use 
the realism of the earlier institutionalists to 
enrich standard price theory as Hicks had 
applied it to the labor market. Kerr, for 
example, says that "members of the revi-
sionist group had been trained in the theory 
of the thirties—in Hicks, in Robinson and 
Chamberlain, and in Keynes ... They did 
not reject theory, as did the institutiona-
lists ... rather, they respected theory and 
wanted to make it more useful in under-
standing practice" (Kerr 1988:13). 
While Kerr admitted that the "revision-
ists" focused their attention on the realism 
and applicability of standard theory rather 
than suggest postulates that would extend 
its explanatory power (Kerr 1988:2-3), he 
would later claim that the revisionists 
achieved their greatest victory in 1963 when 
Hicks (in the second edition of The Theory of 
Wages) acknowledged that social forces play 
an essential role, notjust a marginal one, in 
the labor market (Kerr 1994:68). A close 
inspection of Hicks's 1963 book, however, 
reveals that it contains no mention what-
ever of any of the "realistic studies" by the 
revisionists. Moreover, the seminal works 
by the earliest of the neoclassical labor 
economists (to be discussed later), which 
were being published with regularity by the 
1960s, made virtually no reference to the 
works of the early postwar scholars. It is 
therefore very difficult to argue that the 
latter were "revisionists" in the same evolu-
tionary chain as the founders of modern 
labor economics—and relatively easy to 
accept labeling them as "neoinstitution-
alists."9 
The early postwar scholars were all ener-
getic, trained in economics, academically 
respected, and persuasive enough to take 
on leadership roles of one sort or another 
in academic or government circles. Why, 
then, do they appear more like an exten-
sion of the "institutionalist" line than, as 
they might have hoped, a vehicle for ex-
tending neoclassical theory? Inquiring into 
the reasons for their failure to serve as a 
bridge between the institutional and neo-
classical schools leads us to a consideration 
of intellectual controversies that illustrate 
both the two alternative approaches and 
the compelling attraction of a neoclassical 
framework for viewing the labor market. 
We start with a controversy that arose quite 
explicitly in the 1940s. 
9The term "neoinstitutionalists" was coined by Cain 
(1976). Kerr has called the terminology "inaccurate, 
even misleading" (1988:13). He coined the term 
"neoclassical revisionists" to refer to economists such 
as Dunlop, Reynolds, Lester, and himself. 
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Debate on the Marginal 
Productivity Theory of Demand 
The concept underlying the theory of 
labor demand by firms is the notion that 
adding workers while holding capital con-
stant increases output. These increments 
to output ("marginal productivity") are as-
sumed to diminish, however, as more and 
more labor is added, and a profit-maximiz-
ing firm is posited to stop hiring when the 
value of labor's marginal product falls be-
low the cost of hiring this extra labor. Thus, 
theory implies that when a wage increase 
causes the costs of hiring labor to rise, firms 
will cut their use of labor in order to bring 
the value of marginal productivity back in 
line with marginal labor costs. The concept 
of diminishing marginal productivity and 
the chain of reasoning underlying the pos-
tulated profit-seeking behavior of firms are 
what underlie the downward-sloping labor 
demand curve so central to neoclassical 
theory. 
In an article published in 1946, Richard 
Lester took issue with the relevance of this 
theory of labor demand. His interviews 
with business executives (note the case study 
approach) led him to conclude that these 
decision-makers neither thought in terms 
of marginal productivity nor, as a practical 
matter, could explicitly calculate labor's 
marginal product with any degree of confi-
dence. He therefore concluded that "much 
of the economic reasoning on company 
employment adjustments to increases or 
decreases in wage rates is invalid, and a new 
theory of wage-employment relationships 
for the individual firm must be developed" 
(Lester 1946:71). In essence, Lester 
doubted the relevance of the marginal pro-
ductivity theory of labor demand and as-
serted that its irrelevance was caused by 
simplistic or invalid deductive modeling.10 
'"Lester's criticism of the marginal productivity 
theory of labor demand was similar in some ways to 
earlier criticisms made by Paul Douglas in The Theory 
of Wages. However, Douglas concluded that "the 
forces upon which the productivity school built their 
theories are ... powerful. To the extent that they are 
operative, the conclusions which are drawn from 
Professor Fritz Machlup, then at the 
University of Buffalo, sprang to the defense 
of neoclassical theory by arguing that Lester 
misunderstood the role of theoretical mod-
els in analyzing behavior. Machlup argued 
that a driver of a car deciding whether to 
overtake a truck proceeding slowly in front 
of him on a two-lane road will not explicitly 
measure or calculate in a formal way all the 
variables involved in making a decision 
about overtaking the vehicle. However, if 
scientists were to model and predict this 
driver's behavior, they would have to for-
mally adopt and numerically solve such a 
model. Machlup argued that 
the explanation of an action must often include 
steps of reasoning which the acting individual 
himself does not consciously perform (because 
the action has become routine) and which per-
haps he would never be able to perform in 
scientific exactness (because such exactness is 
not necessary in everyday life). To call, on these 
grounds, the theory "invalid," "unrealistic" or 
"inapplicable" is to reveal failure to understand 
the basic methodological constitution of most 
social sciences. (Machlup 1946:535) 
Machlup's arguments carried the day, and 
even the neoinstitutionalist texts that suc-
ceeded Lester's continued to analyze the 
demand for labor in terms of the marginal 
productivity model. Still, the neoinstitu-
tionalists maintained their deep misgivings 
about price theory's lack of realism. 
The Role of Theory 
in "Realistic" Studies 
As quotations from Kerr and Lester have 
made clear, the early postwar labor econo-
mists felt that standard economic theory 
inadequately represented the complexity 
of observed phenomena. Further, they 
seemed to believe that if they could bring to 
them are valid, and the results are modified but not 
vitiated by the presence of other forces which are at 
work as well" (1934:95). He adds in a footnote, "The 
critics of the marginal productivity theory have fre-
quently betrayed their ignorance of the nature of 
scientific law. The law of gravitation, for example, 
had not been rendered invalid by the development of 
heavier than air airplanes" (p. 95). 
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light "realistic" evidence that was inconsis-
tent with economic theory, then others in 
the economics profession would be moti-
vated to change standard theory as applied 
to the labor market. A case in point was a 
1948 article on money wage movements by 
Reynolds in the American Economic Review, 
which called for economists to be more 
attentive to empirical reality in their model-
building. This article, like those of the 
other neoinstitutionalists, did not attempt 
to construct a new theory or modify an 
existing one to account for apparent em-
pirical inconsistencies. A neoclassical 
economist reading such an article could 
be forgiven for concluding that the au-
thor himself saw little to be gained in 
molding standard theory to fit labor-mar-
ket facts. 
What the neoinstitutionalists failed to 
understand or acknowledge about para-
digm changes was stated by Paul Samuelson 
in a 1951 paper on wage theory: "In eco-
nomics it takes a theory to kill a theory; 
facts can only dent the theorist's hide" 
(Samuelson 1951a:323). Samuelson's im-
plicit view of the centrality of theory to 
social analyses was elaborated more explic-
itly in 1953 by Milton Friedman. While 
neoinstitutionalists were inclined to think 
and write about the enormous complexity of 
labor markets, Friedman argued that the 
whole purpose of theoretical models is to 
strip away complexity so that fundamental 
tendencies can be more clearly seen. 
Models, Friedman argued, should notbe 
judged by the "realism" of their assump-
tions (as the neoinstitutionalists were wont 
to do), because critical behaviors necessar-
ily must be simplified by assumption if pre-
diction is to become possible in a complex 
world. Instead, he argued forjudging theo-
ries by the quality of their predictions. Echo-
ing Machlup, Friedman argued that if a 
theory predicts behavioral tendencies of-
ten enough to find support in the data, 
then it is useful even if its underlying as-
sumptions do not always and everywhere 
hold. 
Friedman's arguments, like those of 
Machlup, helped to intellectually justify 
the approach taken by neoclassicists to la-
bor market issues. Another early contribu-
tion to the debate about how economic 
theory applies to "real" labor markets was 
made by Simon Rot tenberg (1956). 
Rot tenberg directly confronted four 
neoinstitutionalist assertions concerning 
job choice: that "personal" reasons are 
cited by workers as more important than 
the structure of wages when they are inter-
viewed about their occupational choices; 
that workers' choices are made under con-
ditions of ignorance; that workers' concern 
for job security dominates their sensitivity 
to the wage structure; and that workers do 
not act rationally in labor markets. Eco-
nomic theory, Rottenberg pointed out, 
posits that job choice is multi-dimensional 
and that predictions based on this theory 
are made holding other things equal. Theory, 
he argued, does not hold that wages are the 
only thing that matters; rather, wages are 
one of the variables considered when mak-
ing a choice. Moreover, interview responses 
are to be distrusted, both because respon-
dents tend to focus on a single dimension 
when explaining choice and because they 
are reluctant to admit their behavior is 
affected by materialistic motivations. Fur-
ther, to say that information is imperfect 
and that estimations of various job condi-
tions have to be made when making a deci-
sion under conditions of uncertainty does 
not imply that workers cannot act ration-
ally. In sum, Rottenberg, Machlup, and 
Friedman combined to provide important 
clarifications about both the role of theory 
and how to assess its usefulness in explain-
ing "real" labor-market phenomena. 
The "Reach" of Neoclassical Theory 
But how widely, and to what questions, 
could neoclassical theory usefully be ap-
plied? Economics, like many sciences, can 
be divided roughly into theoretical and 
applied fields. While theoretical fields in 
economics are abstract and in the postwar 
period attracted those inclined to see the 
beauty of mathematics, the applied fields 
continued to attract scholars interested in 
practical problems and issues of public 
policy. Labor market scholars are usually 
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of the latter variety, and for these scholars 
to become convinced that economic theory 
could be creatively applied to analyses of 
important labor-market issues required that 
such theory be focused both on the genera-
tion of empirically testable implications and 
on socially interesting topics, even if here-
tofore not seen as within the purview of 
economics. 
In the immediate postwar period, the 
discipline of economics had been invigo-
rated by such scholars as Ragnar Frisch, Jan 
Tinbergen, and Paul Samuelson—the first 
winners of the Nobel Prize in economics— 
who increased the degree of formalization 
in both theory and empirical application. 
On the theoretical side of this mathemati-
cal revolution, neoclassical theory was re-
cast with the use of rigorous derivations, 
which spawned new interest in the field: 
"While institutionalists and many neoclas-
sicists in the interwar period felt that price 
theory had been completed ... the years 
after World War II witnessed a flood of 
articles, each focusing on a certain element 
of the theory, couching it in a newly born 
jargon, and deriving rigorous conclusions 
out of it" (Yonay 1998:186). 
On the empirical front, the field of econo-
metrics—the application of statistical quan-
tification to tests of theoretical proposi-
tions—developed and then exploded after 
the mid-1960s when the computer made it 
possible to perform highly complex calcu-
lations in minutes (and, later, seconds). 
These changes in economics at large helped 
attract to the field of labor economics some 
innovative pioneers who could envision the 
application, and empirical testing, of neo-
classical theory in a variety of "realistic" 
labor-market contexts. 
One such pioneer was H. Gregg Lewis, 
who has been called the "father of modern 
labor economics." Lewis was greatly influ-
enced by theorists at the University of Chi-
cago, where he was both a student and 
professor. While he authored a "classic" 
book and several important articles, his 
contribution to the field was "achieved more 
through teaching and criticism than 
through publication" (Rees 1976:83-84). 
It is difficult to think of an early leader 
among modern labor economists who was 
neither a colleague of Lewis while formu-
lating a seminal work nor among almost 90 
Ph.D. students he supervised over the 
years.11 
In 1957 Lewis published a paper in which 
the secular decline in hours of work was 
analyzed using neoclassical economic 
theory; that Lewis's intellectual heritage 
was squarely in economic theory was indi-
cated by the statement, made early in the 
paper, that "our approach is orthodox: 
mainly the theory of the demand for leisure 
viewed as a consumption good." Lewis's 
classic book, Unionism and Relative Wages in 
the United States (1963), analyzed a tradi-
tional topic in a new way. Instead of focus-
ing on-the history, governance, and tactics 
of unions, as had the neoinstitutionalists, 
Lewis confined his work to a question upon 
which economic theory could empirically 
contribute: the effects of unions in raising 
the wages of their members relative to those 
of nonunion workers.12 
While Lewis's work on unions looked at 
an old topic in a new way, his student (and 
later a colleague) Gary Becker broadened 
the scope of issues to which economic theory 
was addressed. Becker believed that eco-
nomic analysis was applicable to a wide 
range of social phenomena, not just the 
characteristics of producers and consum-
ers traditionally of interest to theorists. In 
his view, the applications of economic 
theory were better defined by methodology 
than by topic: "The combined assumptions 
of maximizing behavior, market equilib-
rium, and stable preferences, used relent-
lessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of 
the economic approach as I see it" (Becker 
1976:5). Becker's writings and his attitude 
were fundamental to the development of 
modern labor economics. 
"Lewis served on the faculty supervising commit-
tee of the doctoral dissertations of Gary Becker, Glen 
Cain, Thomas Finegan, Marvin Kosters, Robert Lucas, 
Walter Oi, Donald Parsons, Albert Rees, Sherwin 
Rosen, and Finis Welch, among others. 
, Lewis continued to study the issue and published 
a second book on the union wage effect more than 
two decades later: see H. G. Lewis (1986). 
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Becker made several major contributions 
that were particularly significant to the 
emergence of neoclassical labor econom-
ics. In 1957 he published The Economics of 
Discrimination, in which he posited that a 
person with a "taste for discrimination" will 
act "as if he were willing to pay something, 
either directly or in the form of a reduced 
income, to be associated with some persons 
instead of others" (Becker 1957:14). Based 
on this concept, Becker provided a frame-
work with which to analyze and measure a 
social problem that is too important to be 
poorly analyzed and understood. 
Becker also was one of the pioneers, 
along with Theodore Schultz (1963) and 
Jacob Mincer (1962b), in the development 
of the theory of human capital. In Human 
Capital (1964), he argued that education 
and on-the-job training should be viewed as 
forms of investment, and that individuals' 
and firms' decisions concerning the amount 
to invest are based on a comparison of costs 
with the expected future returns to these 
investments. Further, as a much-cited ar-
ticle by Walter Oi (1962) pointed out, em-
ployers' decisions concerning the use of 
overtime and layoffs in response to product 
demand fluctuations are critically affected 
by their prior (and expected future) invest-
ments in the hiring and training of work-
ers. Human capital theory was extended to 
the issue of migration by Larry Sjaastad 
(1962), opening up a rich literature on 
both the causes and effects of geographic 
and job mobility. Taken together, these 
theoretical developments opened up seri-
ous study of employee and employer behav-
iors that critically affect job stability, the 
acquisition of skills, and locational choice— 
and hence the level of individual wages, the 
distribution of earnings, and the demand 
for formal and informal schooling (which 
together create the skills that constitute 
over half of our stock of national wealth). 
Becker's third major contribution has 
become known as the theory of household 
production. In his 1965 paper, "A Theory 
of the Allocation of Time," Becker viewed 
household activities as the combination of 
time and goods to produce commodities 
that yield happiness: meals, leisure activi-
ties, clean living spaces, and the like. The 
cost of time at home is measured by for-
gone earnings; thus labor supply and house-
hold decisions are intertwined. Becker's 
work on household production, along with 
Mincer's 1962 paper, "Labor Force Partici-
pation of Married Women," represented 
attempts "to place the theory of labour 
supply in the context of family decision-
making, combining non-market household 
behaviour with market behaviour" (Blaug 
1985:165). Mincer (1962a) found that 
married women's participation rates were 
negatively related to their family's income 
(the "income effect") and positively related 
to their own wage rates, holding income 
constant (the "substitution effect"). Lewis's 
(1957) earlier study of trends in work hours, 
along with Mincer's careful measurement 
and empirical estimation of income and 
substitution effects, marked the beginning 
of "modern research on labor supply" 
(Pencavel 1986:5). The work on labor sup-
ply by Becker and Mincer permitted and 
encouraged widespread analysis of the ris-
ing labor force participation of women and 
the labor supply effects of social welfare 
programs. 
George Stiglerwas another path breaker. 
In the early 1960s, Stigler (1961, 1962) 
developed the economic theory of infor-
mation and its labor sub-field, the theory of 
job search.15 He argued that information is 
More recently, Becker has generalized his theory 
of household production to include various aspects 
of family behavior. In A Treatise on the Family (1981), 
he analyzes "marriage, births, divorce, division of 
labor in households, prestige, and other nonmaterial 
behavior with the tools and framework developed for 
material behavior" (p. ix). 
Other major studies of labor force participation 
published in the 1960s include Cain (1966) andBowen 
and Finegan (1969). The labor supply effects of 
income maintenance programs are analyzed in Cain 
and Watts (1973). 
The theory of j ob search was first suggested by W. 
H. Hutt (1939:59-60), who maintained that an unem-
ployed worker who is actively searching for a job "is 
really investing in himself by working on his own 
account without immediate remuneration. He is 
prospecting... . He judges that the search for a better 
opening is worth the risk of immediately foregone 
income." 
210 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
a valuable resource that is costly to obtain. 
An unemployed person looking for work, 
"unless his degree of specialization is patho-
logical," faces "an immense number of po-
tential employers" and needs to determine 
"how to acquire information on the wage 
rates, stability of employment,... [and work-
ing conditions] which would be obtained 
from every one of these potential employ-
ers" (Stigler 1962:94). Information is ob-
tained by engaging in the costly activity of 
job search, and Stigler argued that a maxi-
mizing worker will continue to search "un-
til the expected return equals the marginal 
cost of search" (1962:96). Because search 
is both necessary and often cheaper when 
one is unemployed, and because the pres-
ence of unemployment insurance effectively 
subsidizes continued search, Stigler's con-
tributions opened up new insights useful to 
the analysis—and to some extent, the 
remediation—of unemployment. 
While Stigler's work on information and 
search costs had relevance to unemploy-
ment, it also could be used to address a 
phenomenon that had contributed to the 
neoinstitutionalists' deep suspicion of stan-
dard theory: the existence of wage differ-
entials in markets where the "law of one 
price" was predicted to hold. Indeed, the 
issues of unemployment and wage differen-
tials nicely illustrate the very different mind-
sets of the neoclassical labor economists 
and their neoinstitutionalist predecessors— 
a topic to which we will shortly turn. 
Intellectually Coping 
with Inconvenient Facts 
One fundamental tenet of basic price 
theory is that the forces of demand and 
supply drive all markets into market-clear-
ing equilibrium. If a price is set above 
equilibrium, for example, supply will ex-
ceed demand, and the responses of profit-
maximizing firms and utility-maximizing 
worker/consumers will eventually drive the 
price down toward equilibrium. The lower 
price will increase the quantity demanded 
and reduce the quantity supplied, with the 
result that the excess supply is reduced or 
eliminated. If the labor market can be 
analyzed like any other market, as Hicks 
had claimed, the persistence of unemploy-
ment seemed to constitute a major contra-
diction of an important theoretical impli-
cation; indeed, in the words of institution-
alist Dale Yoder (1933:119), "Unemploy-
ment must be regarded as deviation away 
from what might be expected to be the 
normal condition." 
One characteristic of the neoclassical 
labor economists—and one that sharply 
dis t inguished them from the neoin-
stitutionalists—was their dogged determi-
nation to find maximizing behavior and 
equilibrium outcomes throughout the la-
bor market. Stigler's insights on search 
made it possible for at least some share of 
overall unemployment to be seen as both 
voluntary and a characteristic of equilib-
rium. If search is cheaper when a worker is 
not encumbered by a job, and if it is not 
always optimal for an unemployed worker 
to take the first job offered, then job seek-
ers could be seen as rationally choosing un-
employment under certain conditions. 
Armen Alchian (1970:29-30) described 
such unemployment as "self-employment 
in information collection." The economic 
theory of job search was further developed 
by Dale Mortensen (1970a, 1970b) and J. J. 
McCall (1970), whose work demonstrated 
that "search unemployment" was an equi-
librium outcome of voluntary behavior on 
both sides of the labor market. These pa-
pers set the stage for an explosion of theo-
retical and empirical research in the 1970s 
and 1980s on the economics of search in 
the labor market.16 
It had long been observed by both insti-
tutional and neoclassical economists that 
cyclical declines in the demand for labor 
This enormous body of research is surveyed in 
Devine and Kiefer (1991). Another view of "volun-
tary" unemployment arising from (utility) maximiz-
ing behavior was suggested by Lucas and Rapping 
(1969); in this model, some workers withdraw their 
labor supply—for the purpose of consuming leisure— 
when their individual wage falls below its normal (or 
"permanent") level. 
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did not lead to declines in wages by enough 
to clear the labor market, as predicted by 
economic theory. Rather, firms tended to 
temporarily lay off workers during down-
turns. The absence of market-clearing 
wages and the use of layoffs seemed to be 
further proof that neoclassical labor eco-
nomics was not realistic. In the mid-1970s, 
Costas Azariadis (1975), Martin Baily 
(1974), and Donald Gordon (1974) inde-
pendently developed the theory of implicit 
contracts, which provided an economic ra-
tionale for temporary layoffs. According to 
implicit contract theory, because workers 
dislike risk while firms are risk-neutral, 
a mutual gain is available to employers and 
employees ... [compared] to a world of purely 
auction labor markets. Employees will, to some 
degree, prefer a lower expected wage with a 
smaller variance to a larger more uncertain 
income. In the interest of getting cheaper 
labor, employers can enter into implicit long-
term quasi-contracts with their employees by 
guaranteeing them some reasonable security. 
(Gordon 1974:78) 
The original implicit contracts models as-
sumed that all workers in a firm were iden-
tical, and that any layoffs that occurred 
were therefore random. Because the share 
of workers laid off even during serious down-
turns was relatively small, and the average 
duration of temporary layoffs was short, 
contracts containing "sticky" wages and lay-
offs offered more income security than con-
tracts in which firms responded to down-
turns by cutting all workers' wages. The 
existence of unemployment insurance 
made contracts containing temporary lay-
offs even more attractive to both firms and 
workers (Feldstein 1976). 
A similar line of reasoning can be used to 
explain why implicit contracts exist in the 
real world where workers are not identical. 
Firms with long employer-employee job 
attachments may be encouraged by older 
workers' risk aversion to engage in senior-
ity-based layoffs rather than wage cuts for 
all workers. Younger workers may be will-
ing to accept such contracts if they know 
that layoffs are temporary and that they will 
eventually attain enough seniority with the 
firm to become "older" workers. Feldstein 
(1976) found that "most workers who are 
laid off are subsequently rehired by their 
original employers," and concluded that 
"because workers remain with the same 
employer through several spells of unem-
ployment, the frequency and duration of 
temporary layoffs must be regarded as part 
of the total package of compensation and 
conditions.... Although any particular lay-
off may be involuntary, the general pattern 
of temporary layoffs may be an explicit part 
of labor contracts" (1976:937-38). In sum, 
it is the view of neoclassical labor econo-
mists that layoff unemployment is not in-
consistent with economic theory.17 
How neoclassical labor economists dealt 
with the issue of wage differentials is per-
haps even more instructive. Elementary 
economic theory strongly implies that work-
ers who have equivalent skills and jobs with 
the same nonpecuniary characteristics will 
receive identical wages.18 This one price 
should prevail, because if it did not, either 
workers in lower-paying jobs would migrate 
to the higher-paying ones, or the higher-
paying employers would be driven by com-
petition in the product market to reduce 
their wages. Therefore, an implication of 
simple theory is that, absent temporary dis-
equilibria, observed wage differentials 
should be related empirically only to the 
supply (that is, human capital) characteris-
tics of workers or the nonpecuniary aspects 
of their jobs—and not to the industry, size, 
or "ability to pay" of their employers. The 
problem for labor economists is that this 
implication is contradicted by the data, 
which suggest the existence of persistent 
wage differentials among firms hiring from 
the same labor market. Indeed, the prob-
"Implicit contract theory is surveyed in Rosen 
(1985). Burdett and Mortensen (1980) provide a 
synthesis of search and implicit contract theory. 
The theory of wage differentials that compen-
sated for nonpecuniary differences in jobs, originally 
outlined by Adam Smith, was fully developed by 
Sherwin Rosen (1974) in an influential paper thatwas 
seminal to a burgeoning empirical literature on com-
pensating wage differentials. 
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lem of wage differentials was a corners tone 
of neoinst i tut ional is ts 'd is t rust of economic 
theory: "It is the apparent failure of local 
rates to equalize which has long been seized 
upon by critics of competit ive theory as 
their prime exhibit" (Reder 1962:312).19 
The neoinst i tut ional is ts had explained 
these theoretically embarrassing wage dif-
ferentials in a number of ways that they 
bel ieved u n d e r m i n e d the neoclass ica l 
model . Reynolds, in his 1970 text (pp. 1 0 1 -
17), pointed to a numberoipotential expla-
nations: wages that were downwardly in-
flexible, internal labor markets , discrimi-
nat ion, "anti-pirating" agreements among 
employers , unionism, poor information, 
restricted entry to occupat ional training 
programs, the failure of firms to maximize 
profits, and sheer tradit ion. While these 
scholars were clearly seeking generaliza-
t ions, none cast their analyses in terms of 
neoclassical theory (that is, using a sparse 
model of maximizing behavior in the face 
of compet i t ion and constra ints) . 
Melvin Reder, at Stanford, was among 
the first of the "modern" labor economists 
to directly address the issue of wage differ-
entials apparent ly associated with employer 
( including industry) characterist ics. In a 
1962 paper on the topic of demand-s ide 
wage differentials he revealed an att i tude 
very characterist ic of the neoclassical labor 
economists: 
Most discussions of interindustry wage differen-
tials proceed without much explicit consider-
ation of economic theory. The literature 
abounds in ad hoc hypotheses, some of which 
are consistent with economic theory but many 
of which are not. However, these various hy-
potheses are usually treated as being equally 
plausible, a priori; consistency with the implica-
tions of price theory has counted for very little 
in appraising the merits of a theory. Our atti-
tude is somewhat different; we believe that if a 
theory is inconsistent with the implications of 
19Reder's views of the early 1960s are echoed today 
by Kaufman (1994:146), who says that "the single 
most important empirical issue in labor economics is 
the degree to which labor markets are competitive." 
price theory it is cause for concern, and that an 
explanation is in order. (Reder 1962:276) 
To Reder and others of the same stripe, 
neoclassical theory was i n n o c e n t until 
proven guilty, and like good defense law-
yers, they readily marshaled plausible alibis 
and mitigating circumstances when the facts 
looked damning . On the topic of why 
inter indust ry wage differentials did not 
show signs of d isappear ing over t ime, as 
theory suggested should happen , Reder 
invoked two defenses that were to become 
fairly standard: the data observed might 
inadvertently be from periods that exhib-
ited short-run disequil ibria, and the studies 
might not have control led for all the vari-
ables that influenced the observed outcome 
(in this case, possible changes in the geo-
graphical distr ibution of firms and the oc-
cupational skill mixes within industr ies) . 
While Reder did concede that the persis-
tence of inter industry wage differentials 
could imply that the competi t ive hypoth-
esis was wrong, the internal logic of el-
ementary neoclassical theory was clearly 
compell ing enough to prevent his theoret i-
cal hide from being easily dented by mere 
facts. He reasoned that, "to be sure, there 
is a tendency for out-of-line wages to be 
corrected as soon as the 'oppor tuni ty pre-
sents itself,' but it is also true that large 
firms are more dilatory about correct ing 
overpayment" (Reder 1962:285). He im-
mediately allowed that this dilatory behav-
ior was "not explained by the competi t ive 
hypothesis ," but u n d a u n t e d , he concluded 
his paper by arguing that the competi t ive 
hypothesis had not been disproved. He 
reasoned that "it can hardly be said to be 
firmly established as an explanat ion of wage 
p h e n o m e n a even for long periods; but it 
has at least survived (reasonably well) the 
tests to which it has so far been put" (Reder 
1962:298). Thus, Reder ' s a t t i tude, like that 
of other neoclassicists, was essentially that 
models assuming maximizing behavior can 
explain labor-market p h e n o m e n a if only 
researchers are well-enough endowed with 
data and methodologies to apply the ap-
propr ia te empirical tests. 
Reder ' s unswerving allegiance to neo-
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classical theory was testimony to the intel-
lectual appeal of a simple, internally consis-
tent model of behavior. To a neoclassical 
economist, the logic of price theory was so 
utterly convincing—especially in the ab-
sence of a competing theory—that logic 
itself was called upon to settle what ap-
peared to be empirical disputes. Paul 
Samuelson, for example, had this to say in 
the 1951 edition of his textbook: 
The fact that a firm of any size must have a wage 
policy is additional evidence of labor market 
imperfections ... But just because competition 
is not 100 per cent perfect does not mean that it 
must be zero. The world is gray, not black or 
white ... If you try to set your wage too low, you 
will soon learn this. At first nothing much need 
happen, but eventually you will find your work-
ers quitting a little more rapidly than otherwise 
would be the case. (Samuelson 1951b:598) 
In this passage, Samuelson is dealing with 
the empirically based charge that small 
changes in wages do not always cause work-
ers (or customers) to immediately move 
from poorer opportunities to better ones, 
as posited by elementary theory. Instead of 
arguing that elementary theory is inad-
equately realistic, however, or presenting 
empirical data to show that market behav-
ior actually is consistent with theoretical 
predictions, Samuelson reasons from sheer 
logic: even if labor-market mobility is re-
stricted for some reason, it must surely be 
the case that in the long run employers 
who depart from paying market wages 
will be punished. He might have added, 
"What other outcome could there be?" 
Without another theory that was equally 
appealing in terms of its logic, those with 
an analytic inclination could imagine no 
outcomes other than those implied by 
price theory. 
Inside the Firm and Work 
Groups: Neoclassical Approaches 
to Neoinstitutionalist Interests 
In 1971 Peter Doeringer and Michael 
Piore published an important book, Inter-
nal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis, 
that in many ways picked up where the early 
postwar neoinstitutionalists had left off. The 
book expanded on earlier studies by 
Reynolds, Kerr, and Dunlop.20 Reynolds 
(1951) had concluded from his study of 
labor markets in a medium-sized New En-
gland city that "each company employment 
office is really a distinct market for labor" 
(p. 42). He found that wage dispersion 
across firms was "very substantial," and that 
"nonwage terms of employment... tend to 
accentuate wage differences rather than to 
offset them" (pp. 221-22). Kerr (1954), in 
his famous paper on the "balkanization" of 
labor markets, developed the concept of 
"institutional" labor markets that were gov-
erned by formal and informal rules rather 
than by economic variables. These institu-
tional labor markets "create truly 
noncompeting groups." The rules set sharp 
"boundaries between the 'internal' and 'ex-
ternal' [labor] markets and define more 
precisely the points of entrance.... Workers 
inside the market.. . are not in direct com-
petition with persons outside." The term 
"internal labor market" was coined by 
Dunlop (1966), who maintained that both 
unionized and nonunionized employers 
"tend to develop an elaborate set of prac-
tices or rules relating to promotions, trans-
fers, layoffs, and retirements for various 
groups of job classifications; they confine 
entry from outside the organization ... to 
a limited number of classifications" 
(1966:32).21 
Doeringer and Piore (1971:2-3) defined 
an internal labor market as "an administra-
tive unit, such as a manufacturing plant, 
within which the pricing and allocation of 
labor is governed by a set of administrative 
rules and procedures." This internal labor 
- Both Doeringer and Piore were students of John 
Dunlop at Harvard. 
In an earlier paper, Dunlop (1957:135) presented 
a table of the average hourly wages for unionized 
truck drivers in Boston in July 1953. The table showed 
that the wages varied sharply across industries. How-
ever, wages for truck drivers within a "wage contour" 
(basically an industry) tended to be equal. He con-
cluded that these wage contours had developed over 
time, and that they demonstrated that a "perfect 
labor market" did not exist (pp. 135-37). 
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market was distinguished from the exter-
nal labor market, "where pricing, allocat-
ing, and training decisions are controlled 
directly by economic variables." Movement 
between the two labor markets 
occurs at certain job classifications which con-
stitute ports of entry and exit to and from the 
internal labor market. The remainder of the 
jobs within the internal market are filled by the 
promotion or transfer of workers who have al-
ready gained entry. Consequently, these jobs 
are shielded from the direct influences of com-
petitive forces in the external market. 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971:3) 
Doeringer and Piore (1971, Chapter 8) 
also examined the implications of dual la-
bor market theory, originally developed by 
Piore (1969). This theory postulates that 
the labor market is divided into primary 
and secondary markets. Jobs in the primary 
sector are high-paying, with good working 
conditions, employment stability, and 
chances for promotion. In contrast, jobs in 
the secondary market are low-paying, with 
high turnover, poor working conditions, 
and little chance for promotion. Disadvan-
taged workers "are confined to the second-
ary market by residence, inadequate skills, 
poor work histories, and discrimination" 
(p. 166). Primary sector jobs are associated 
with internal labor markets; some second-
ary jobs are "completely unstructured," 
while others are attached to internal labor 
markets, although they include few, if any, 
of the privileges typically associated with 
such labor markets. 
Further analysis of internal labor mar-
kets and dual labor markets has been done 
by Bennett Harrison (1972), David Gordon 
(1972), Lester Thurow (1975), Edwards, 
Reich, and Gordon (1975), and Paul 
Osterman (1975, 1984), among others. 
These studies examine individual firms' 
hiring and pay practices, the reasons for 
the existence of internal labor markets, 
and the consequences of internal labor 
markets for the distribution of earnings 
and differential economic opportunity. 
Given the influence of Dunlop and Kerr on 
these scholars, one is tempted to refer to 
them as "neo-neoinstitutionalists." 
The literature on internal labor markets, 
and the seeming inconsistencies of impor-
tant labor-market outcomes with the pre-
dictions of simple neoclassical theory, chal-
lenged neoclassical labor economists to 
expand their analyses of wage determina-
tion beyond their traditional focus on mar-
ket tendencies—and to regard as worthy of 
analysis the wage setting practices by indi-
vidual employers. Moreover, at least partly in 
response to the neo-neoinstitutionalist lit-
erature, neoclassical economists have be-
gun to widen their "homo economicus" 
view of economic agents as narrowly self-
serving and autonomous, to include con-
siderations of social interdependency and 
context. 
For example, the theory of efficiency 
wages offers explanations based on maxi-
mizing behavior both for the existence of 
wage differentials for workers with similar 
characteristics and for the payment of wages 
in excess of market-clearing levels. Accord-
ing to this theory, higher wages affect the 
net productivity of workers by reducing 
their propensity to quit and by increasing 
their levels of effort. Profit-maximizing 
employers are willing to pay above market-
clearing wages, because such a strategy in-
creases labor productivity more than it in-
creases costs (Akerlof and Yellen 1986). 
Efficiency wage theory offers an explana-
tion for wage dispersion and for dual labor 
markets: the "wage-productivity nexus" is 
more important in some sectors of the 
economy than in others. In the primary 
sector, where the wage-productivity nexus 
is assumed to hold, workers are paid above 
market-clearing wages; in the secondary 
sector, where above-market wages are not 
profitable, labor markets clear (Yellen 
1984:201). Bulow and Summers (1986) 
constructed a model of dual labor markets 
based on the causal relationship between 
wages and productivity, and used it to ex-
plain interindustry and intraindustry wage 
differentials, discrimination, and involun-
tary unemployment. 
A recent version of efficiency wage theory, 
the "fair wage-effort hypothesis" (Akerlof 
and Yellen 1990), contends that workers 
will withhold effort if they are paid a wage 
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below what they consider to be fair. It is 
possible that the fair wage exceeds the 
market-clearing wage (1990:255-56). The 
"fair wage-effort hypothesis" is one possible 
explanation for the interindustry wage dif-
ferentials (for workers with similar skills in 
similar jobs) found by the neoinstitu-
tionalists—for example Slichter (1950) — 
and by Dickens and Katz (1987) andKrueger 
and Summers (1987, 1988). According to 
Akerlof and Yellen (1990:265), "if firms 
must pay a high wage to some groups of 
workers—perhaps because they are in short 
supply or perhaps to obtain high quality— 
demands for pay equity will raise the gen-
eral wage scale for other labor in the firm, 
who would otherwise see their pay as un-
fair."22 
The importance of fairness in labor mar-
kets was also discussed by Nobel laureate 
Robert Solow in his book, The Labor Market 
as a Social Institution (1990). Solow con-
tended that "the fundamental reason for 
believing that fairness is a factor in labor 
markets is what we know about our own 
society and culture.... Once you admit to 
yourself that wage rates and employment 
are profoundly entwined with social status 
and self-esteem you have already left the 
textbook treatment of the labor market 
behind" (pp. 9-10). Robert Frank argued 
in his book, Choosing the Right Pond: Human 
Behavior and the Quest for Status (1985), that 
individuals place a value on status in their 
local reference group, and that this can 
explain why within-firm differences in indi-
viduals' wages are often smaller than differ-
ences in their marginal products. The pub-
lications discussed above all encompass 
social interdependencies in a theoretical 
model, thus allowing concerns for "fair-
ness" and status to be associated with maxi-
mizing behavior in a context of markets 
and constraints. Finally, it could be said, 
Katz and Summers (1989) offer another expla-
nation for interindustry wage differentials: workers 
in certain industries are able to extract rents—in the 
form of wages in excess of their best alternatives— 
from their employers. 
issues that were so important to the 
neoinstitutionalists are being addressed by 
price theorists.23 
In recent years, neoclassical economists 
have begun to model several other labor-
market characteristics or outcomes that 
seem at first blush to be inconsistent with 
the predictions of neoclassical theory. Ed-
ward Lazear (1979,1981), for example, has 
dealt with the issue of why older workers 
might be paid more than their marginal 
products. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981) 
and Rosen (1986) raised the issue of why 
small differences in productivity among top 
executives can lead to huge differences in 
pay, while James Brown and Orley 
Ashenfelter (1986) took a new look at an 
older issue raised by Dunlop: why firms 
(and their unions) have latitude within 
which they can design their internal com-
pensation structures. Indeed, a new text-
book by Lazear, entitled Personnel Economics 
for Managers (1998), now applies the prin-
ciples of rigorous economic reasoning to a 
variety of human-resource management is-
sues (hiring, training, paying, motivating, 
and promoting workers) of long-standing 
interest to the neoinstitutionalists (see also 
Lazear 1995). Unlike the neoinstitution-
alists, however, neoclassical labor econo-
mists have built their studies of firm behav-
ior upon models of maximization in the 
face of constraints (Baker, Gibbons, Murphy 
1994; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994). 
Neoclassical Labor 
Economics and Public Policy 
By the early 1970s, neoclassical econo-
mists had become prominent enough that 
they substantially contributed, both philo-
sophically and empirically, to the national 
debate that ended military conscription in 
the United States (President's Commission 
"Neoclassical economists' interest in fairness is 
not new, although one could argue that it has been 
suppressed for some time. In 1883 Alfred Marshall 
wrote a paper entitled "A Fair Rate of Wages." The 
paper is reprinted in Marshall (1925:212-26). 
216 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
onan All-Volunteer Armed Force 1970). It 
was increasingly recognized that economic 
theory and the measurable implications that 
could be derived from it were useful for 
understanding the effects of labor market 
institutions and policies. Neoclassical la-
bor economics thoroughly adopted econo-
metric techniques as a means of extending 
"dry bones" theory into the real world of 
institutions and government programs. 
One of the areas to which neoclassical 
labor economists turned their attention 
was labor supply behavior, spawned in part 
by the negative income tax experiments of 
the late 1960s and the 1970s. Significant 
advances in the way in which labor supply 
models were econometrically specified and 
estimated were made early on by Orley 
Ashenfelter and James Heckman (1974) 
and Heckman (1974), with later additions 
by Heckman and Thomas MaCurdy (1980), 
MaCurdy (1981), Ashenfelter (1983), and 
Joseph Altonji (1986), among others. 
Heckman (1979, 1980) developed a now 
widely used statistical technique to correct 
for the selectivity bias that occurs when 
individuals in one group (for example, 
workers) differ from those in the other 
(those choosing not to work) in ways that 
are not easily measured. 
Research in the area of human capital 
mushroomed, with an early focus on the 
rates of return to personal and social edu-
cational investments (Hanoch 1967; 
Griliches 1970). These early interests, cen-
tral to issues of educational policy, led di-
rectly to new empirical techniques to deal 
with possible problems of "ability bias" and 
self-selection associated with estimating the 
returns to schooling, and to more recent 
studies of the effect of school quality on 
student achievement and future earnings.24 
Job training programs, which were part of 
President Johnson's Great Society in the 
On ability bias and selection bias, see, for ex-
ample, Griliches (1977), Willis and Rosen (1979), 
Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), and Card (1995). 
On the effects of school quality, see Hanushek (1986) 
and Card and Krueger (1992). 
later 1960s, also became an object of study 
by analytical labor economists; Ashenfelter's 
(1978) analysis of the effects of govern-
ment training programs on the post-train-
ing earnings gains of trainees is an early 
example of a study examining the costs and 
benefits of public sector training. 
Other policy-related areas of research 
that attracted neoclassical scholars touched 
on issues of immigration, gender, and race. 
Barry Chiswick (1978), and later George 
Borjas (1985, 1987, 1990) and David Card 
(1990a), contributed analyses of the eco-
nomic effects of immigration.25 The sharp 
increase in female labor force participa-
tion since World War II was mirrored by an 
increase in research on women in the work-
place. Early studies measuring the size of— 
and offering explanations for—male-female 
earnings differences were undertaken by 
Ronald Oaxaca (1973), Jacob Mincer and 
Solomon Polachek (1974), and Francine 
Blau (1977), while Blau and Lawrence Kahn 
(1996, 1997), Claudia Goldin (1990), and 
Blau and Ehrenberg (1997) offer more re-
cent perspectives of the problems and 
progress experienced by the female labor 
force. Following the lead of Gary Becker, 
neoclassical labor economists also sought 
to measure and explain the economic dis-
advantages faced by the African-American 
labor force. Early work by Ashenfelter 
(1970,1972) and the authors in Ashenfelter 
and Rees (1973) was followed by a robust 
literature summarized in Donohue and 
Heckman (1991). 
The study of unions, long of interest to 
government policy-makers and labor econo-
mists alike, was broadened beyond the esti-
mation of unions' wage effects. The model 
of labor-management bargaining and strike 
activity originally postulated by Hicks (1932) 
was expanded to include union leadership 
and rank-and-file as separate parties and 
statistically tested by Ashenfelter and 
George Johnson (1969) and Henry Farber 
(1978). Empirical tests of the asymmetric-
25See also the papers in Abowd and Freeman (1991) 
and Borjas and Freeman (1992). 
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information model of strike activity were 
undertaken by Joseph Tracy (1987) and 
David Card (1990b). 
In 1984, two neoclassical labor econo-
mists, Richard Freeman and James Medoff, 
published a book entitled What Do Unions 
Do?, in which they argued that neoclassical 
economists had produced "very little quan-
titative evidence concerning the impact of 
U.S. unionism on outcomes other than 
wages," and that they generally ignored the 
neoinstitutionalists' view that unions often 
raise productivity and induce better man-
agement. Freeman and Medoff used newly 
available computerized data files, which 
contained vast amounts of information on 
thousands of individuals, establishments, 
and companies, to statistically analyze "many 
of the nonwage effects of trade unions" 
(pp. 4-5). Their results indicated that 
many of the neoinstitutionalists' observa-
tions concerning unions were correct. In 
particular, they found that unions raised 
productivity in many sectors of the economy, 
largely as a result of lower rates of turnover 
under unionism and of "improved manage-
rial performance in response to the union 
challenge" (pp. 21-22). While the conclu-
sion that the positive aspects of unionism 
usually outweighed the negative (mo-
nopoly) aspects remains open to question 
(see Hirsch 1991), the issue is one that has 
important policy implications for a society 
that still debates whether the government 
should take a more (or less) active role in 
encouraging the growth of union power. 
In addit ion to interests in the 
longstanding policy issues regarding 
unions, discrimination, education, and 
immigration, neoclassical labor econo-
mists began attempts (following Rosen 
1974) to identify and measure market 
failures as they related to the relatively 
new "social" regulation of workplace 
safety (see Smith 1979; and later, Viscusi 
1993). In addition, the "adverse incen-
tives and distributional anomalies" of the 
U.S. system of unemployment compensa-
tion noted by Feldstein (1974) were exam-
ined by Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976), 
Hamermesh (1977), Brechling (1977), Topel 
(1983), and Burdett and Wright (1989). 
The energy and frequency with which 
theory was being applied by labor econo-
mists to issues of social and economic policy 
raised the question of whether the modern 
approach could go very far beyond the 
walls of academe and be widely useful for 
policy purposes. John Dunlop thought not: 
"Tests of the elegance, coherence, and gen-
erality of economic and industrial relations 
models and theories are intellectually ex-
citing and challenging, but their relevance 
and application to policy making is scarcely 
within the reach of most researchers" 
(Dunlop 1977). 
Neoclassical labor economists (Ehren-
berg et al. 1977) strongly demurred, argu-
ing that the Carter administration's policy 
decision to tax unemployment insurance 
benefits was but one contemporary example 
of the influence on public policy of neo-
classical analysis (which had demonstrated 
that higher benefits encourage longer spells 
of joblessness). By the 1980s neoclassical 
labor economists had become so intimately 
involved with policy analyses—for the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisors; the Department 
of Labor; the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare; the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission; international 
development agencies; the Congressional 
and Executive Budget Offices; and even the 
CIA—that they were forced to give more 
attention to issues raised by the institution-
alists. 
The greater interest of neoclassical labor 
economists in public policy issues, and their 
growing influence, forced three major 
changes in the field. First, because one 
cannot understand public policy issues with-
out a thorough grounding in institutional 
detail, neoclassical labor economists neces-
sarily became more institutional in their 
interests. Seemingly small administrative 
details about how unemployment or work-
ers' compensation insurance premiums are 
set, for example, have huge implications 
for the layoff or safety behavior of employ-
ers; labor economists wanting the ear of 
policy-makers had to know these details. 
Moreover, institutions have histories that 
both reflect and affect behavior; the 
ahistorical approach of pure theory might 
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yield behavioral tendencies, but usually a 
larger context is required if sensible poli-
cies are to be promulgated. Daniel 
Hamermesh's 1977 book on unemployment 
compensation, which was aimed at an audi-
ence much wider than professional econo-
mists, was but an early example of the kind 
of attention that is now routinely given to 
institutional details by neoclassical labor 
economists studying welfare programs, im-
migration, workers' compensation, inter-
national comparisons of job training, and 
many other labor market issues. 
Second, along with greater prominence 
in public policy came greater responsibility 
for the accuracy and credibility of empiri-
cal results. Few in society care in the ab-
stract about whether capital and labor are 
used under conditions of constant elastic-
ity of substitution in the mining of coal, but 
if the implicit tax of the Black Lung Ben-
efits Program is being debated, the condi-
tions under which coal is produced matters 
very much because real jobs are on the line. 
The quality of one's data, and the statistical 
specifications and methods used, began to 
really matter when the answers started to 
affect lives instead of "dry bones" abstrac-
tions. Interestingly, the lively disputation 
over the findings of David Card and Alan 
Krueger (1995) relative to the minimum 
wage'have mostly focused on the quality of 
data and the replicability of statistical esti-
mates (Neumark and Wascher 1997; Card 
and Krueger 1997). 
Third, greater policy prominence re-
quired labor economists to write for new 
audiences—people who are intelligent but 
not necessarily schooled in the use of eco-
nomicjargon or patient with complex equa-
tions. In the 1990s, for example, various 
issues of the Economic Report of the President 
addressed labor-market topics requiring 
non-technical treatments of such concepts 
as labor supply theory (1992:148), com-
pensating wage differentials (1993), the 
natural rate of unemployment (1994), the 
returns to human capital investments 
(1996), and distinguishing labor demand 
from labor supply shifts as explanations of 
growing wage inequality (1997). When 
their research began to matter to others 
besides their colleagues, labor economists 
had to use ordinary English instead of jar-
gon. Congressman Lee Hamilton recently 
wrote: "For me, the most important quality 
for economists to have when they are testi-
fying or advising policy-makers is the ability 
to express their ideas on important policy 
issues clearly and simply, without jargon" 
(Hamilton 1992:61). 
Recentyears, therefore, have seen move-
ment away from some of the more academi-
cally insular features of "pure" neoclassical 
analyses of the labor market toward includ-
ing some "realistic" characteristics of the 
institutionalist approach. More research-
ers are collecting their own data, and more 
are now relying on case studies (often, "natu-
ral experiments") involving some exog-
enous economic or policy change to create 
the comparisons needed for hypothesis test-
ing.26 Even controlled experiments have 
been run, both inside and outside the labo-
ratory. 
Thus, the stated mission of the 
neoinstitutionalists—causing simple price 
theory to adapt to the unique realities of 
the labor market—seems to be on its way to 
fulfillment. Neoclassical labor economists 
are now—at long last, some would say— 
addressing some of the issues that had so 
consumed the interest of neoinstitution-
alists, and they have turned out to be simi-
lar to their neoinstitutionalist predecessors 
in the fundamental desire to understand 
how employers and employees really be-
have. While "dry bones" neoclassical theory 
provides the skeletal framework for mod-
ern analyses, empirical flesh and blood still 
provides labor economists with the motiva-
tion. Early empirical work using large data 
sets and advanced computing techniques 
provided general support for some theo-
retical implications but offered disappoint-
ing results regarding others; further scien-
tific advances therefore required taking 
more sophisticated account of social and 
26See, for example, Card (1990a) on the labor 
market effects of the Mariel boatlift, and Meyer, 
Viscusi, and Durbin (1995) on supply responses to 
changes in workers' compensation benefits. 
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institutional idiosyncrasies. If the new ar-
eas of inquiry within neoclassical labor eco-
nomics are in fact driven by the imperatives 
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